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THE LEGAL ARCHITECTURE OF
UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING:
A CASE STUDY OF UNIFIL
Layan Charara*
Over the course of the United Nations’ (the “UN” or the “Organization”) history, the Organization’s arsenal for the maintenance of international peace and security has evolved substantially. The UN employs a number
of tactics in pursuit of international cooperation, including diplomacy,
blockades, economic sanctions, and disruptions in means of communication.
One operation engaged by the UN since its inception is particularly controversial: peacekeeping. The first UN peacekeeping contingent, the United
Nations Emergency Force, was deployed during the 1956 Arab-Israeli conflict. Since then, 71 peacekeeping operations have been deployed, 14 are
ongoing, and 3,826 peacekeeper fatalities have been reported, more than
1
half of which were due to accident or malicious act.
Using the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (“UNIFIL” or “the
Force”) as a case study, this Note provides a treatment of the legal recourse
available to peacekeepers injured or killed in the service of the UN. This
Note focuses on the incident of July 25, 2006—when four UN peacekeepers
were killed in Khiam, South Lebanon—to demonstrate that the existing legal architecture insufficiently protects the rights of the UN and its peacekeepers. UNIFIL illustrates this problem in three principal ways: (1) the status of peacekeepers is unresolved in international law, and existing
instruments such as the Safety Convention are not comprehensive enough;
(2) not all parties to a conflict come within the ambit of the existing legal
regime; and (3) UNIFIL is deeply entangled in the Arab-Israeli conflict,
which affects its ability to discharge its mandate and the international community’s ability to ensure the safety and security of UNIFIL personnel.
While UNIFIL is distinctive with respect to item (3), items (1) and (2)
are shared by other peacekeeping missions, making all UN Member States’
obligation to ensure the safety and security of UN peacekeepers substantively inadequate. Accordingly, this Note explores the ways UNIFIL is a unique
peacekeeping force that can still teach broader lessons about UN peacekeep-

*
J.D., December 2018, University of Michigan Law School. My thanks go to Professor Kristina Daugirdas for her insights and feedback on earlier versions of this Note. I am also
grateful to the editors of the Michigan Journal of International Law for their thoughtful edits.
Finally, I am thankful for the troops of UNIFIL and their efforts to maintain peace in my
homeland—efforts exerted at the expense of their own safety and security in a land far from
their own.
1.
Data, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/data; Fatalities, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/fatalities (last updated Feb. 28, 2019).
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ing. It is organized into four parts: Part I provides a contour of UN peacekeeping operations; Part II chronicles the history of UNIFIL; Part III analyzes the current legal regime with respect to UN peacekeeping; and Part IV
surveys solutions offered in the past and recommends more apposite courses
of action to strengthen the legal recourse available to peacekeepers and their
families.

I. United Nations Peacekeeping at a Glance
Peacekeeping operations are not explicitly mentioned anywhere in the
2
UN Charter (the “Charter”). As such, scholars and practitioners struggle to
reach consensus on the definition of such operations. Former SecretaryGeneral Boutros Boutros-Ghali defined peacekeeping as
the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto
the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United
Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as
well. Peacekeeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for
3
both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace.
The deployment of peacekeeping operations is widely understood as an
exercise of the Security Council’s primary responsibility for the mainte4
nance of international peace and security. The Security Council fulfils this
responsibility by enacting measures pursuant to Charter Chapters VI and
VII, which provide for the pacific settlement of disputes and enforcement
actions respectively. Although Security Council resolutions on peacekeeping operations typically cite Chapter VI or VII as the legal basis for their establishment, it is often contended that peacekeeping developed in the gray
zone between these two chapters, making its precise place in the Charter
5
difficult to locate. In recent years, however, peacekeeping missions have
6
been expressly deployed as Chapter VII operations. The UN maintains that

2.
ROBERT C.R. SIEKMANN, NATIONAL CONTINGENTS IN UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING FORCES 4–5 (1991).
3.
Michael Bothe & Thomas Dörschel, The UN Peacekeeping Experience, in THE
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF VISITING FORCES 487, 487 (Dieter Fleck ed., 2001).
4.
U.N. Charter art. 24.
5.
Members of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping called for the addition of a
chapter between VI and VII on peacekeeping. The proposal has yet to gain serious traction.
RAMESH THAKUR, INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING IN LEBANON: UNITED NATIONS
AUTHORITY AND MULTINATIONAL FORCE 21, 29 (1987). Peacekeeping has instead been referred to as a “Chapter VI and a half” operation, a term first coined by former SecretaryGeneral Dag Hammarskjöld. 60 Years of United Nations Peacekeeping, UNITED NATIONS
PEACEKEEPING, http://www.un.org/en/events/peacekeepersday/2008/60years.shtml (last visited Mar. 28, 2019).
6.
Mandates and the Legal Basis for Peacekeeping, UNITED NATIONS
PEACEKEEPING, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mandates-and-legal-basis-peacekeeping (last
visited Mar. 28, 2019).
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invocation of Chapter VII serves as a “means of reminding the parties to a
conflict and the wider UN membership of their obligation to give effect to
Security Council decisions.”7 The UN also attributes peacekeeping operations to Article 29 of the Charter, which grants the Security Council the
power to establish subsidiary organs it deems necessary for the performance
8
of its functions.
UN peacekeeping comprises two distinct types of operations known as
“first generation” traditional peacekeeping, intended to end interstate conflict, and “second generation” peacekeeping, which entails expanded man9
dates that seek to maintain intrastate peace. In the absence of clear guidance from the Charter, the rules of peacekeeping developed ad hoc over the
years and culminated in three basic principles: consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the force’s
10
mandate.
Consent. Consent of the parties to the conflict is necessary to provide
peacekeeping forces with freedom of action to fulfil their mandates. Ab11
sence of consent risks entangling forces as parties to conflicts. Furthermore, should any complications arise, “the [consent] of the host state constitutes an element of a contractual relationship between the United Nations
and the host state. Thus, rights and duties of the United Nations may be de12
rived from that consent.”
Consent is typically manifested in the form of a status of forces agree13
ment (“SOFA”). SOFAs are critical legal instruments that define the relationship between a UN peacekeeping force and its host state and guarantee
14
the legality of a peacekeeping force’s presence in a country’s territory.
Their importance for peacekeeping operations is evinced by the UN’s
promulgation of a model SOFA that is intended to be used provisionally un15
til a more tailored one is negotiated.
In the interstate context, when a peacekeeping force acts as a buffer,
“not only the host state but also its adversary, a neighbouring country, must
have given its consent to this before there can be any question of peace-

7.
Id.
8.
The General Assembly may also establish peacekeeping missions. SIEKMANN, supra note 2, at 126.
9.
CHEN KERTCHER, THE UNITED NATIONS AND PEACEKEEPING, 1988–95, at 1–5
(2016).
10.
Principles
of
Peacekeeping,
UNITED
NATIONS
PEACEKEEPING,
http://peacekeeping.un.org/en/principles-of-peacekeeping (last visited Mar. 28, 2019).
11.
Id.
12.
Bothe & Dörschel, supra note 3, at 492.
13.
Discussed further infra Part III.
14.
Id. at 491; RAY MURPHY, UN PEACEKEEPING IN LEBANON, SOMALIA AND
KOSOVO: OPERATIONAL AND LEGAL ISSUES IN PRACTICE 7 (2007).
15.
Annex F: Model Status-of-Forces Agreement for Peacekeeping Operations (UN
Model SOFA), in THE HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF VISITING FORCES, supra note 3, at 603.
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16

keeping.” This consent does not, however, guarantee cooperation with or
17
the safety of peacekeeping forces. Often, adversarial or neighboring countries’ interference in a peacekeeping force’s ability to fulfil its mandate un18
dermines any tacit consent they may provide for its deployment.
Impartiality. The UN understands impartiality in peacekeeping as
an objective and consistent execution of the mandate, regardless of
provocation or challenge. Impartiality does not mean inaction or
overlooking violations. UN peacekeepers should be impartial in
their dealings with the parties to the conflict, but not neutral in the
execution of their mandate, i.e., they must actively pursue the implementation of their mandate even if doing so goes against the in19
terests of one or more of the parties.
Impartiality is demanded by the fact that peacekeeping forces must stand
between warring parties and remain credible in order to achieve their man20
date. One party’s distrust of a peacekeeping force can frustrate its entire
21
mission.
Self-Defense and Defense of the Mandate. UN peacekeeping operations
are usually not enforcement tools. However, the Security Council occasionally confers “robust” mandates, which authorize the use of force in selfdefense and in defense of the mandate should certain parties attempt to
22
thwart its execution. The UN asserts that robust peacekeeping should not
be confused with Chapter VII peace enforcement; “[r]obust peacekeeping
involves the use of force at the tactical level with the authorization of the
Security Council and consent of the host nation and/or the main parties to
the conflict,” whereas peace enforcement does not require consent and may
23
involve greater military force.

II. The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
In the context of Arab-Israeli peacekeeping operations, agreement on a
mandate does not translate into agreement on perceptions and expectations
24
vis-à-vis peacekeeping forces. This issue came to the fore when UNIFIL
SIEKMANN, supra note 2, at 6.
See infra Part II.
See infra Section III(B).
UNITED NATIONS, HANDBOOK ON UNITED NATIONS MULTIDIMENSIONAL
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 56 (2003).
20.
Mandates and the Legal Basis for Peacekeeping, supra note 6.
21.
See infra Part II.
22.
UNITED NATIONS, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS: PRINCIPLES
AND GUIDELINES 19 (2008). The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (“UNIFIL”) is an
example of a force with this kind of mandate.
23.
Id. at 34.
24.
NATHAN A. PELCOVITS, PEACEKEEPING ON ARAB-ISRAELI FRONTS 17 (1984).
16.
17.
18.
19.
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was established in 1978, following Israel’s invasion of South Lebanon.
UNIFIL’s original mandate in March 1978, codified in Security Council
Resolution 425, was to “confirm withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern
Lebanon, restore international peace and security, [and] assist the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the ar25
ea.” Its mandate was expanded by the Security Council following the 2006
Lebanon War to monitor the cessation of hostilities, ensure the withdrawal
of Israeli forces from Lebanon, assist in securing the Lebanese border, and
26
ensure the provision of humanitarian assistance.
UNIFIL was deployed in the midst of two diverging conflicts whose
parties often converged—the Arab-Israeli conflict, in which South Lebanon
has long been an active front, and the Lebanese Civil War, raging intermittently from 1975 until its conclusion in 1990. The two conflicts intersected
at the question of Palestine due to the presence of hundreds of thousands of
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, many of whom took up arms on behalf of
the Palestine Liberation Organization (the “PLO”) and turned South Leba27
non into a base from which to launch attacks at Israel. Consequently, Lebanon became a target of violent Israeli retaliation, which culminated in Isra28
el’s invasion of South Lebanon in 1978 and 1982.
Lebanese and Israeli opinions of UNIFIL diverged. The Lebanese government—to the extent it existed in the midst of the civil war—welcomed
the establishment of UNIFIL as it sought to distance itself from Palestinian
29
attacks on Israel and wanted Israeli forces out of its territory. The Israelis,
on the other hand, sought to thwart and humiliate UNIFIL from the outset,
for they felt the Force was imposed on them without their case being
30
heard. They considered Resolution 425 “inadequate and sorely lacking”
because it did not explicitly ban “terrorists”—that is, the PLO—from return31
ing to Lebanon. As such, the Israeli government maintained that its invasion of Lebanon was in self-defense due to PLO attacks and consistently
32
frustrated UNIFIL’s goals.
Throughout the Lebanese Civil War, UNIFIL was the greatest threat to
Israel’s goals of crushing Palestinian resistance and installing a friendlier
33
Lebanese government. The Security Council recognized that Israel was the
foremost obstacle to achieving UNIFIL’s mandate, “deplor[ing],” in Resolu25.
UNIFIL Mandate, UNIFIL, https://unifil.unmissions.org/unifil-mandate (last visited
Mar. 28, 2019).
26.
Id.
27.
Karim Makdisi, Reconsidering the Struggle over UNIFIL in Southern Lebanon, 43
J. PALESTINE STUD. 24, 24–25 (2014).
28.
ANTHONY VERRIER, INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING 126 (1981).
29.
Makdisi, supra note 27, at 27–28.
30.
VERRIER, supra note 28, at 118; PELCOVITS, supra note 24, at 18.
31.
Makdisi, supra note 27, at 29–30.
32.
Id. at 29.
33.
Id. at 32.
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tion 444, Israel’s lack of cooperation with UNIFIL and its assistance to
34
armed groups in the South. Trust and confidence in UN peacekeeping
forces by local parties are crucial for their success; persistent Israeli suspicions and bombardment were—and continue to be—a significant threat to
35
UNIFIL’s mandate.
Although Israel formally withdrew from South Lebanon in 2000, tensions continue to simmer at the Lebanese-Israeli border and threaten to materialize into conflict. Between 1978, the year of UNIFIL’s establishment,
and the time of writing, 313 UNIFIL fatalities were reported—the most of
36
any UN peacekeeping mission. A number of these fatalities are attributable
to Israel, in addition to the armed groups previously present in South Leba37
non. Should another conflict between Lebanon and Israel take place,
38
peacekeepers will once again be in the line of fire.
The remainder of this Note focuses on one particular incident during the
2006 Lebanon War—that of July 25, when four unarmed UN peacekeepers
were killed during an Israeli airstrike on a UN observation post in Khiam,
39
South Lebanon. According to accounts of the incident, an Israeli F-16
fighter jet dropped a 1,000-pound bomb directly onto the UN compound in
40
Khiam. Journalistic reports describe the UN position as displaying clear
41
UN markings, including waving the UN flag outside the compound. According to the UNIFIL press release following the incident, there were 14
42
prior incidents of firing by Israeli forces close to this position. The

34.
Id.
35.
THAKUR, supra note 5, at 59.
36.
Fatalities, supra note 1.
37.
See MURPHY, supra note 14, at 309.
38.
Even during times of relative peace between Lebanon and Israel, peacekeepers are
still in danger. For example, a Spanish peacekeeper was killed by Israeli fire in 2015, although
Israel asserts it was not intentional. Israel Admits Its Fire Killed Spanish UN Peacekeeper,
BBC (Apr. 7, 2015), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-32206393.
39.
The four observers killed in the airstrike were UN Military Observers, part of the
UN Observer Group Lebanon (the “OGL”). The OGL supports UNIFIL, operates out of
UNIFIL bases, and patrols along the “Blue Line” with UNIFIL. They are tasked with observing and reporting violations of agreements of ceasefire and disengagement. In its discussions
of this incident, the Security Council refers to the military observers killed as UNIFIL peacekeepers. For the purposes of consistency, and given the nature of the OGL’s activities, this
Note adopts this terminology. UNTSO Operations, UNITED NATIONS TRUCE SUPERVISION
ORG., https://untso.unmissions.org/untso-operations (last visited Mar. 28, 2019).
40.
Robert Fisk, It Is 10 Years Since UN Peacekeepers Were killed in Southern Lebanon – and it Could Happen Again Now, INDEPENDENT, https://www.independent.co.uk/
voices/it-is-10-years-since-un-peacekeepers-were-killed-in-southern-lebanon-and-it-couldhappen-again-now-a7154571.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2019); Rory McCarthy, Suzanne
Goldberg, & Oliver Burkeman, Israelis Ignored Repeated Warnings Before Killing UN Observers, GUARDIAN (July 26, 2006, 9:11 PM EDT), https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2006/jul/27/syria.israel4.
41.
E.g., Fisk, supra note 40; McCarthy, Goldberg, & Burkeman, supra note 40.
42.
Press Release, UNIFIL
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UNIFIL Force Commander “was in repeated contact with Israeli Army officers throughout the afternoon, pressing the need to protect that particular
43
UN position from firing.” Journalists and Commandant Kevin McDonald,
an Irish officer serving in UNIFIL at the time, similarly reported that UN
officers repeatedly pleaded with Israel to cease fire, and Israel offered false
44
assurances. A UN officer speculated—anonymously—that Israel may have
sought to prevent the UN observers from reporting on its activities in that
area as Khiam was a strategic location from which to maneuver armor into
45
Lebanon.
Secretary-General Kofi Annan described the incident as an “apparently
46
deliberate targeting” of a clearly marked UN observer post by Israel. Israel
refused UN participation in the investigation into the incident, asserting it
was an error and that it would “never intentionally target any UN facility or
47
personnel.” Israeli authorities accepted full responsibility for what they de48
termined was an “operational level” mistake. Secretary-General Annan
lamented that the UN Board of Inquiry “did not have access to operational
or tactical level IDF commanders involved in the incident,” resulting in the
Board’s failure to determine what exactly happened and “why the attacks on
the UN position were not halted, despite repeated demarches to the Israeli
49
authorities . . . .”
The Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon, tasked with investigating the
2006 Lebanon War, ultimately concluded that there was no justification for

(July 26, 2006), https://unifil.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/old_dnn/pr010.377fa8e780e2-4249-b26f-95b578aa6d3a.pdf; see also Kevin Mc Donald, Peacekeeping on the Edge:
Observer Group Lebanon and the 2006 Israel – Lebanon War, https://www.academia.edu/
27311015/PEACEKEEPING_ON_THE_EDGE (last visited Mar. 28, 2019).
43.
Press Release, UNIFIL (July 26, 2006), supra note 42; see also Warren Hoge, U.N.
Says It Protested to Israel for 6 Hours During Attack That Killed 4 Observers in Lebanon,
N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/27/world/middleeast/
27nations.html.
44.
Fisk, supra note 40; Mc Donald, supra note 42.
45.
Fisk, supra note 40.
46.
Annan “Shocked:” by Israeli Attack on UN Lebanon Post that Killed at least 2, UN
NEWS (July 25, 2006), https://news.un.org/en/story/2006/07/186862-annan-shocked-israeliattack-un-lebanon-post-killed-least-2.
47.
Israeli Responses to Accidental Killing of Four UNIFIL soldiers, ISR. MINISTRY
FOREIGN AFF. (July 26, 2006), http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/pressroom/2006/pages/
israeli%20responses%20to%20accidental%20killing%20of%20four%20unifil%20soldiers%
2026-jul-2006.aspx.
48.
Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Comm’n of Inquiry on Lebanon Pursuant to
Human Rights Council Resolution S-2/1*, ¶¶ 233–43, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/3/2 (Nov. 23, 2006).
49.
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WHY THEY DIED: CIVILIAN CASUALTIES IN LEBANON
DURING THE 2006 WAR 115 (2007), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/
lebanon0907.pdf; Press Release, Secretary-General, Secretary-General Receives Report on
Attack that Killed Observers at Khiam, Lebanon, U.N. Press Release SG/SM/10666 (Sept. 29,
2006).
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50

this direct attack—or any other attack—on UN personnel during the war.
Due to these events, the UN was compelled to relocate peacekeeping personnel in South Lebanon “as potential threats to the unarmed military ob51
servers [could] no longer be mitigated by other means.” This incident
sheds light on the three principal shortcomings of the UN peacekeeping regime and demonstrates the nature of the attacks UNIFIL personnel endure
52
and what recourse is available.

III. Legal Recourse Available to Peacekeepers
The legal framework of UN peacekeeping is usually comprised of a Security Council or General Assembly resolution establishing the force, a
SOFA or Status of Mission Agreement, agreements between the troopcontributing states and the UN, and regulations for the force issued by the
53
Secretary-General. However, peacekeeping operations do not exist in a
vacuum. On the contrary, they implicate the broader framework of international law by virtue of being stationed in conflict zones and products of international relations and diplomacy.
The following sections analyze the international legal regimes that offer
recourse to peacekeepers, paying special attention to Israel’s status as a state
party to the conflict. As discussed in Part II, a number of parties complicated UNIFIL’s mission, including non-state actors like the PLO and Hizballah. Their involvement notwithstanding, the legal issues considered below
will primarily account for the states that are recognized subjects of international law and not the non-state actors whose status in the international legal
framework is currently unsettled. While the current architecture offers a
number of hypothetical avenues for relief, the circumstances of this particular case make provision of reparations particularly challenging, as will be
demonstrated in the following sections.

A. The UN Charter
1. Member States’ Obligations
The Charter of the UN sets out the purposes of the establishment of the
Organization in Chapter I. These purposes include maintaining international
peace and security, developing friendly relations among nations, achieving
international cooperation to solve international problems, encouraging re54
spect for human rights, and harmonizing the fulfilment of these purposes.

50.
Human Rights Council, supra note 48, ¶ 19.
51.
U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated 29 July 2006 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2006/595 (July 29, 2006).
52.
See supra pp. 1–2.
53.
MURPHY, supra note 14, at 309.
54.
U.N. Charter art. 1.
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The Charter stipulates that Member States must fulfil the obligations enshrined in the Charter in good faith and that they must refrain from endan55
gering international peace and security.
The Security Council discharges its duty to maintain international peace
56
and security in accordance with Charter Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII.
Peacekeeping operations are established pursuant to the Security Council’s
responsibility to maintain international peace and security. As such, peacekeeping operations are carried out in accordance with the Purposes and
57
Principles of the UN.
Member States are obligated to accept and carry out the decisions of the
Security Council, in addition to providing the UN with assistance for any
58
action it takes in accordance with the Charter. In other words, Member
States have a legal obligation to ensure that they do not impede the Security
Council’s actions or endanger the peace and security the Council endeavors
59
to maintain. Although the Charter does not expressly obligate Member
States not to thwart the Security Council, the obligations to act in accordance with the Principles of the Organization and to accept and carry out the
decisions of the Security Council arguably entail an obligation not to act in
60
contravention of these said Principles and decisions. In the peacekeeping
context, this means that attacks on peacekeepers may be construed as a
breach of an obligation under the UN Charter—an act that is a violation of
international law with legal consequences. Who may bring a claim for such
a violation is a more difficult question.

2. The UN as Applicant
In theory, the UN may raise a claim against a state that inflicts harm or
damage on its property or agents, including peacekeepers. In the Reparation
for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations case, the International Court of Justice (the “ICJ”) held that the UN is an international person that is “a subject of international law and capable of possessing international rights and duties, and that it has capacity to maintain its rights by
61
bringing international claims.” The court went on to say,
in the event of an agent of the United Nations in the performance of
his duties suffering injury in circumstances involving the responsibility of a Member State, the United Nations as an Organization has
the capacity to bring an international claim against the responsible
55.
U.N. Charter art. 2.
56.
U.N. Charter art. 24.
57.
See U.N. Charter arts. 1, 24, ¶ 2.
58.
U.N. Charter arts. 2, ¶ 5, 25.
59.
See U.N. Charter arts. 2, ¶ 3, 25.
60.
See U.N. Charter arts. 2, ¶ 3, 25.
61.
Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory
Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 174, 179 (Apr. 11).
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de jure or de facto government with a view to obtaining the reparation due in respect of the damage caused to the United Nations. . . .
[And,] the reparation due in respect of the damage caused to the
62
victim or to persons entitled through him.
The court further held that, when the UN is bringing such a claim for damages caused to its agent, “it can only do so by basing its claim upon a breach
63
of obligations due to itself . . . .”
The Court assumed that the breached obligation due to the UN in this
case is the obligation to “protect the agents of the Organization in the per64
formance of their duties.” In its discussion, the Court stresses that the particular damage at issue is “damage caused to the interests of the Organization itself, to its administrative machine, to its property and assets, and to
65
the interests of which it is the guardian.” Causing such damage, according
to the Court, constitutes a breach of an international obligation “designed to
66
help an agent of the Organization in the performance of his duties.” The
Court links this obligation to Article 2(5) of the UN Charter, which requires
Member States to “give the United Nations every assistance in any action it
67
takes in accordance with the present Charter . . . .” This obligation arguably encompasses a duty not to endanger agents of the Organization in the
performance of their duties—discharged pursuant to the UN Charter—or to
thwart their ability to effectively perform their duties, in addition to affirma68
tively protecting them in the performance of their duties.
The UN may invoke a right due to it and ask for reparation on the basis
that “it is a principle of international law that the breach of an engagement
69
involves an obligation to make reparation in an adequate form . . . .” Following the ICJ’s Reparations opinion, General Assembly Resolution 365
(IV) authorized the Secretary-General to bring an international claim against
the government of a state that is alleged to have caused damage to the UN
70
and in respect of the injury caused to the victim. Thus, if peacekeepers are
classified as UN agents—acting in the interest of the Organization and pursuant to its Charter—then the UN can bring claims on their behalf as described in the Reparations case and pursuant to Resolution 365. That is, the
UN has the legal capacity to bring a claim against Israel for the injury and

62.
Id. at 187.
63.
Id. at 188.
64.
Id. at 177.
65.
Id. at 180.
66.
Id. at 180, 182.
67.
U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 5.
68.
See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949
I.C.J. Rep. at 183.
69.
Id. at 184.
70.
G.A. Res. 365 (IV) (Dec. 1, 1949).
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death of its peacekeepers because they are agents of the Organization that
Israel is obligated to protect.
Peacekeeping missions are deployed pursuant to the provisions of the
UN Charter. The UN deploys these missions as a guardian of the interests of
international peace and security. As a Member State of the UN, Israel is obligated to carry out the Security Council’s decisions and refrain from en71
dangering international peace and security. If the July 25 attack on
UNIFIL was deliberate, then Israel violated its international obligations under the UN Charter by targeting peacekeepers whose very objective is to restore peace and security. Raising a claim under Israel’s account of the
events—namely, that it was an accident—is also plausible given Israel’s ob72
ligation to protect agents of the UN in the performance of their duties.
The UN has in fact brought claims against Member States in instances
where a government is accused of injuring UN staff in the course of peace73
keeping missions. Unfortunately, “[t]he great majority of these claims
74
were not settled and the States did not agree to arbitration.” Additionally,
there are political considerations the UN must account for when Israel is
concerned—most significantly, the United States’ unwavering support for
its ally. While the Security Council may request an advisory opinion from
the ICJ on the legality of Israel’s actions with respect to UNIFIL, the United
States would likely use its veto power in the Security Council to prevent
75
such an action. The General Assembly may find more support for such a
request, but the ICJ’s advisory opinions carry no binding force and cannot
76
compel Israel to take any action.
In the Reparations case, the ICJ also reaffirmed that a state has the capacity to bring an international claim against another state for damages suf77
fered by its nationals. The opinion does not preclude the possibility of
concurrent claims by the agent’s national state and the UN. In fact, the
Court acknowledges that the interests of both the national state and the Organization may be engaged, although their claims may arise under different
78
bases. Neither the national state nor the Organization has priority over the
claim, but the ICJ maintains that the parties should cooperate to find a prac-

71.
U.N. Charter arts. 24–25.
72.
See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949
I.C.J. Rep. at 177.
73.
Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, Claims Against International Organizations: Quis custodiet ipsos custodes, 7 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 131, 148 (1981).
74.
Id.
75.
The UN itself cannot be party to a contentious case before the ICJ. Statute of the
International Court of Justice arts. 34, ¶ 1, 65, June 26, 1945, 3 U.S.T. 1153.
76.
Advisory Jurisdiction, INT’L CT. JUST., https://www.icj-cij.org/en/advisoryjurisdiction (last visited Mar. 28, 2019).
77.
Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J.
Rep. at 177.
78.
Id. at 185.
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79

tical solution. Accordingly, the national states of injured or killed UN
peacekeepers may coordinate with the UN to bring an international claim
against another state, or they may pursue international claims on their own
if the UN’s political concerns cannot tolerate raising such a claim. However,
in the context of performing duties as an agent of the UN, it is preferable for
the UN itself to guarantee its agent protection rather than his/her own state
80
in order to ensure the agent’s independent action. Furthermore, as illustrated later in this Note, a peacekeeper’s national state raising a claim against
Israel proved nearly impossible given Israel’s lack of cooperation in the
81
case of the four UN observers.

B. Status of Forces Agreements
SOFAs are typically concluded as bilateral agreements between the UN
and the country hosting UN peacekeeping forces. They are a staple in UN
peacekeeping operations as they secure the legality of a peacekeeping
82
force’s presence in its host country’s territory. SOFAs outline the rights
and duties of peacekeeping forces, and their substance is negotiated with the
host state in order to ensure forces can carry out their mandates in their area
83
of operation without undue influence. These agreements define the privileges and immunities of UN forces, ensure freedom of movement for peacekeepers, guarantee facilities for forces, and provide dispute settlement
84
mechanisms among other arrangements.
Ideally, SOFAs should be signed prior to the deployment of a peacekeeping force, but, given that peacekeeping operations are often assembled
85
in haste, this is not always possible. In fact, UNIFIL operated without a
SOFA for 20 years. Consequently, the Force was left to rely on precarious
assurances that a Lebanese government at war—without effective control of
UNIFIL’s area of operation and within the greater context of the question of
Palestine—would uphold a gentlemen’s agreement, respect the UN’s privileges and immunities, and ensure the safety of its peacekeepers. Allegiance
to a gentlemen’s agreement is contingent upon whether a party derives any
benefit from compliance with it, so respect for UNIFIL’s authority and
86
rights was not always guaranteed prior to the SOFA’s conclusion. Moreo79.
Id. at 185–86.
80.
Id. at 183–84.
81.
See infra Section IV(B).
82.
Bothe & Dörschel, supra note 3, at 491.
83.
MURPHY, supra note 14, at 108.
84.
E.g., Annex F: Model Status-of-Forces Agreement for Peacekeeping Operations
(UN Model SOFA), supra note 15, at 603.
85.
MURPHY, supra note 14, at 108.
86.
Id. at 111; There are, of course, other protections within the frameworks of international human rights law and international humanitarian law that provide peacekeepers with
protections, whether a SOFA is in place or not, and they are discussed infra Sections III(C)–
(E).
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ver, because SOFAs are usually bilateral agreements, Israel is outside the
scope of the obligations enshrined in the Lebanon-UN agreement, leaving
peacekeepers without similar recourse against one of the parties to the conflict.
Prior to the adoption of the 1994 Convention on the Safety of United
87
Nations and Associated Personnel (the “Safety Convention”), the absence
of a SOFA left peacekeepers in a vulnerable position insofar as their legal
status was concerned. The nature SOFAs take on in conflict situations is peculiar, as is demonstrated by the case of UNIFIL. Traditional peacekeeping
forces are deployed to temper hostilities between distinct parties, and such
deployment necessitates the involvement of more than one party. And yet, a
SOFA is only signed by the UN and the host government. This certainly
makes sense with respect to the fact that the forces are only present in the
host country, but SOFAs include additional obligations that should be enforced against other parties to the conflict as well.
The SOFA between Lebanon and the UN establishes a reciprocal obligation to treat one another and undertake operations “with full respect for
the principles and spirit of the general international conventions applicable
to the treatment of military and civilian personnel[,]” including the Four
88
Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols. Additionally, Chapter
VII of the UNIFIL SOFA provides mechanisms to settle disputes and claims
89
of a private law character. Due to Israel’s 1978 and 1982 invasions of
Lebanon, UNIFIL was compelled to monitor the behavior of this “third par90
ty” as part of its de facto mission. Given the reality of the situation confronted by UNIFIL and the Secretariat’s knowledge of the facts on the
ground, the UN should have made more concerted efforts to insure its forces
in South Lebanon vis-à-vis Israeli hostility by means of a similar agreement
91
with Israel.
Political circumstances, however, dictated otherwise. Israeli hostility to
92
UNIFIL was evident prior to its deployment, so the suggestion of a multilateral SOFA between the UN, Lebanon, and Israel or a bilateral agreement
between the UN and Israel was likely out of the question. Furthermore, Israel is generally skeptical of the UN and often uncooperative, as was the case
when the four observers were killed. Ultimately, it may not be viable to
conclude multilateral SOFAs for all peacekeeping missions, but it is an option worth pursuing as it will bolster the legal protections for peacekeepers
caught between enemy lines and expressly obligate states parties to comply
with such legal obligations.
87.
See infra Section III(D) for further discussion of this treaty.
88.
Agreement on the Status of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, Leb.U.N., art. 7(a)–(b), Dec. 15, 1995, 1901 U.N.T.S. 397.
89.
Id. ch. VII.
90.
MURPHY, supra note 14, at 249–50.
91.
Makdisi, supra note 27, at 31.
92.
See infra Part II.
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C. The Law of Armed Conflict
International humanitarian law (“IHL”), also known as the law of
93
armed conflict, regulates the conduct of hostilities in armed conflicts. It is
codified in the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols. The
Conventions and Protocols endeavor to protect those who are not participating in hostilities—namely, civilians, health and aid workers, and those who
94
have ceased participation in hostilities. The Geneva Conventions enjoy
widespread ratification. Lebanon is party to Conventions I–IV and Protocols
95
I and II, and Israel is party to Conventions I–IV and Protocol III. A number of principles of IHL are enshrined in customary international law as
well.
It is clear that when UN forces become engaged in hostilities, they
come within the purview of the law of armed conflict as combatants, and the
Geneva Conventions apply to them with equal force as is applied to national
96
troop contingents. However, the rights owed to UN forces not participating
in hostilities under IHL are not entirely settled because the framework’s
97
subject is the combatant/participant, not the peacekeeper.
Protocol I provides that attacks on peacekeeping units, civilian personnel, and their property do not constitute military objectives and would thus
98
be unlawful if conducted by a party to an international armed conflict. Article 37(1)(d) of Protocol I prohibits “[t]he feigning of protected status by
the use of signs, emblems or uniforms of the United Nations or of neutral or
99
other States not Parties to the conflict.” One interpretation of this provision
is that it “clearly envisages that the United Nations, and, by extension, U.N.
personnel, have some kind of ‘protected status,’ but the nature of that status
and the rights and obligations which flow from it are not set out in the Pro100
tocol.” Although Lebanon is party to Protocol I, Israel is not. Thus, these
provisions are of no avail to UNIFIL unless they are crystallized in customary international law.

93.
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Their Additional Protocols, INT’L
COMMITTEE RED CROSS (Jan. 1, 2014), https://www.icrc.org/en/document/genevaconventions-1949-additional-protocols.
94.
Id.
95.
Treaties, States Parties and Commentaries, INT’L COMMITTEE RED CROSS,
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/vwTreaties1949.xsp (last visited Mar. 28,
2019).
96.
Christopher Greenwood, Protection of Peacekeepers: The Legal Regime, 7 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT’L L. 185, 188–89 (1996).
97.
See generally id. (describing the Geneva Conventions’ inapplicability to certain
situations UN peacekeepers operate in).
98.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) arts. 48, 50–52, June
8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
99.
Id. art. 37, ¶ 1(d).
100.
Greenwood, supra note 96, at 190.
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There is a debate as to whether peacekeepers are “protected persons”
under Geneva Convention IV, defined as “those who, at a given moment
and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of
101
which they are not nationals.” The subsequent provision of the Convention excludes nationals of a State which is not bound by the Convention and
nationals of a neutral State that has diplomatic relations with the State into
102
whose hands the nationals of the neutral state have fallen. It is argued that,
because UN contingents are typically drawn from countries that have diplomatic relations with the parties to the conflict, they do not constitute pro103
tected persons.
Given that the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (the
“ICC”) declares intentionally targeting UN peacekeepers a war crime—and
thus, there is theoretically a venue for bringing such claims under IHL—
there may not be a great deal of utility to a debate on whether peacekeepers
104
should or do have protected status under the Geneva Conventions. However, because neither Lebanon nor Israel is party to the Rome Statute, this is
105
not a viable avenue for recourse. It is also worth noting that IHL’s obligation not to target peacekeepers is ineffective considering the rise in attacks
106
on UN peacekeeping missions. Rather than impose negative obligations in
this context, the international legal regime should obligate states to affirmatively protect and ensure the safety of UN peacekeepers, which the Safety
107
Convention purports to do.

D. The 1994 Convention on the Safety of United Nations and
Associated Personnel
The 1994 Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated
Personnel was adopted in haste after statistics collected by the UN Secretariat indicated peacekeepers and other UN personnel were being targeted and
101.
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
art. 4, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
102.
Id.
103.
Greenwood, supra note 96, at 193.
104.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8, ¶ 2(b)(iii), July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
105.
The States Parties to the Rome Statute, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://asp.icccpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20rome
%20statute.aspx (last visited Mar. 28, 2019).
106.
See CARLOS ALBERTO DOS SANTOS CRUZ, IMPROVING SECURITY OF UNITED
NATIONS PEACEKEEPERS: WE NEED TO CHANGE THE WAY WE ARE DOING BUSINESS
(2017),
https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/improving_security_of_united_nations_peaceke
epers_report.pdf.
107.
Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel arts. 7, 11,
opened for signature Dec. 15, 1994, 2051 U.N.T.S. 363.
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108

killed at alarming rates. The Safety Convention purports to criminalize
attacks on peacekeeping troops under two circumstances. The first is when
they participate in operations established for the purpose of maintaining or
restoring international peace and security, and the second is when the Security Council or General Assembly declares there exists an “exceptional risk
109
to the safety of the personnel participating in the operation . . . .” The
Convention protects “United Nations personnel,” meaning “[p]ersons engaged or deployed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations as members of the military, police or civilian components of a United Nations oper110
ation,” and “[a]ssociated personnel,” who are not under UN control.
A treaty distinct from the Geneva Conventions was needed because the
laws of war do not encompass protections for non-combatants undertaking
111
traditional peacekeeping operations. Forces deployed by the UN for enforcement actions under Chapter VII are, however, covered by the laws of
112
war. This distinction resulted in Article 2(2) of the Safety Convention,
which provides that
[t]his Convention shall not apply to a United Nations operation authorized by the Security Council as an enforcement action under
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations in which any of
the personnel are engaged as combatants against organized armed
forces and to which the law of international armed conflict ap113
plies.
The use of force by peacekeepers not engaged in enforcement actions in isolated cases, without sustained fighting, does not preclude application of the
Safety Convention, for they are still not engaged as combatants in such an
114
instance.
Article 4 of the Safety Convention requires host states and the UN to
115
conclude SOFAs. Acts criminalized by the Convention are set out in Arti116
cle 9 with the caveat that they must be intentionally commissioned. Article 10 requires States Parties to the Convention to establish their jurisdiction

108.
Evan T. Bloom, Protecting Peacekeepers: The Convention on the Safety of United
Nations and Associated Personnel, 89 AMERICAN J. INT’L L. 621, 621–22 (1995).
109.
Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, supra note
107, art. 1(c).
110.
Id. art. 1(a)–(b).
111.
Bloom, supra note 108, at 624.
112.
See supra p. 5 for a brief discussion of Chapter VII enforcement actions.
113.
Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, supra note
107, art. 2, ¶ 2.
114.
Bloom, supra note 108, at 625.
115.
Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, supra note
107, art. 4.
116.
Id. art. 9. The criminal acts include murder, kidnapping, violent attack, threat to
commit such attacks, and attempts to commit such attacks.
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over the crimes outlined in Article 9 when the crime is committed in their
117
territory or when the alleged offender is a national of that State. Article 13
118
provides measures to ensure extradition or prosecution of the offender.
The Safety Convention entered into force in 1999. Lebanon ratified the
Convention in 2003, 25 years after the establishment of UNIFIL. Israel is
neither a signatory nor a party to the Convention. Hardly any host states are
currently parties to the Convention; in fact, only three of fourteen host states
119
are parties. Given that the UN is unlikely to abandon peacekeeping anytime soon, and 14 peacekeeping operations are ongoing, the Organization
must deploy greater efforts to ensure widespread ratification of such an important treaty.
If Israel was party to the Safety Convention, the peacekeepers killed
during the 2006 conflict would hypothetically have an avenue of legal recourse. As persons engaged in one of the enumerated capacities in Article 1
of the Convention, they fall under the “UN personnel” category. A claim
could have been brought by the states that may establish jurisdiction over
the crime pursuant to Article 10 of the Convention—that is, Lebanon or Israel. One way that Lebanon could have proceeded in such an instance is by
grounding its complaint in Articles 7 and 11 of the Convention, which impose a duty on States Parties to ensure the safety and security of UN per120
sonnel and to prevent crimes against UN personnel. A direct attack on a
peacekeeping operation is a violation of these articles. Israel would then be
obligated to extradite the culprit to Lebanon for prosecution pursuant to Ar121
ticles 13 and 15 or to prosecute the culprit itself pursuant to Article 14.
This sequence of events, however, is impossible to imagine in reality.
Israel and Lebanon are technically still at war. They have been adversaries
since the establishment of the State of Israel. There can be no mutual assistance as envisioned by Article 16 of the Convention or any kind of cooperation conceived by the Convention in its entirety. It is unimaginable that Israel would extradite the culprit of the 2006 attacks to Lebanon given that the
IDF were engaged in a war against Lebanon. Israel’s assertion that the incident was a mistake can also be read as an indication that it would not prosecute the individual(s) in its own courts. In other words, actions taken by the
117.
Id. art. 10.
118.
Id. art. 13.
119.
Dieter Fleck, The Legal Status of Personnel Involved in United Nations Peace Operations, 95 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 613, 627 (2013); 8. Convention on the Safety of United
Nations and Associated Personnel, UN TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/pages/
ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-8&chapter=18&clang=_en, (last visited
Mar. 28, 2019).
120.
Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, supra note
107, arts. 7, 11.
121.
Israel arguably could accomplish this absent the need for the Safety Convention
based on its own regulations for its troops’ conduct if it so desired. However, this space for
state discretion may explain why a treaty or more expansive obligations for the international
community as a whole are needed.
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IDF in Lebanon in 2006—deliberate or not—are unlikely to be punished.
This illustrates perhaps the greatest shortcoming of the Safety Convention
and the international legal architecture of peacekeeping in general—it does
not contemplate the obstacles posed by states hostile to one another.
While universal ratification of the Safety Convention is of the utmost
importance, it is still a flawed instrument. It is a product of rushed negotiations, and even its Optional Protocol fails to account for the legal and logis123
tical issues that may thwart its effectiveness. One solution may be to negotiate an additional protocol that provides for third-party facilitation of
124
dispute settlement, which would narrow states’ discretionary space. In
contentious cases like this, it may be more appropriate for the UN to bring a
claim on behalf of its personnel, as defined in Article 1 of the Safety Con125
vention and Article 26 of the UNIFIL SOFA. However, this raises similar
concerns that were discussed in Section III(A). Israel may not be party to
the Safety Convention because of its animosity toward UNIFIL. This further
illustrates the need for imposing obligations on the international community
126
as a whole with respect to the protection of peacekeepers.

E. The Security Council
In a statement following the July 25 incident, the President of the Security Council communicated the Council’s shock at the death of the four UN
127
observers and concerns about the safety of UN personnel. The President
stressed “that Israel and all concerned parties must comply fully with their
obligations under international humanitarian law related to the protection of
United Nations and its associated personnel and underline[d] the importance
128
of ensuring that United Nations personnel are not the object of attack.”
Yet, the Security Council did little to actually protect UN peacekeeping
forces in South Lebanon.
Pursuant to the UN Charter, Member States are legally obligated to
comply with Security Council decisions—that is, when the Security Council
“decides” to take a certain course of action in a resolution, Member States
129
must accept and carry out that decision. In contrast, when the Security
122.
This is not to say that Israel has no regard for maintaining a culture of accountability in the IDF. Rather, it reflects the nature of Israel’s conflict with Lebanon.
123.
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, adopted Dec. 8, 2005, 2689 U.N.T.S. 59.
124.
See supra note 121.
125.
“Military observers and civilian personnel other than United Nations officials . . .
shall be considered as experts on mission within the meaning of article VI of the [Privileges
and Immunities] Convention.” Agreement on the Status of the United Nations Interim Force
in Lebanon, supra note 88, art. 26.
126.
See infra Section IV(C).
127.
S.C. Pres. Statement 2006/34 (July 27, 2006).
128.
Id.
129.
U.N. Charter art. 25.
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Council uses language such as “calls upon” or “urges,” Member States are
under no concrete obligation to comply. The Security Council’s resolutions
on the situation in Lebanon demonstrate its lack of decisive action on the
matter. For example, in Resolution 1697, following the deaths of the UN
observers, the Council did not “decide” that Israel violated its obligation to
ensure the safety of UNIFIL personnel or that Israel must abide by its international obligations and refrain from targeting peacekeepers. Instead, the
Council
[u]rge[d] all concerned parties to abide scrupulously by their obligation to respect the safety of UNIFIL and other United Nations
personnel, and avoid any course of action which might endanger
United Nations personnel, and calls on them to allow the Force to
resupply its positions, conduct search and rescue operations on behalf of its personnel and undertake any other measures the Force
130
deems necessary to ensure the safety of its personnel . . . .
The Security Council decided to extend the mandate of UNIFIL and remain
actively seized of the matter but did little to hold any party accountable for
131
endangering and killing UNIFIL troops.
The Security Council was apprised of the situation in Lebanon in 2006
132
on a number of occasions throughout the conflict. UN documents demonstrate that Member States raised concerns about the conflict frequently—
before and after the incident of July 25—and Secretary-General Kofi Annan
himself addressed the Council about the death of the UN observers in
133
Khiam and the ongoing risks UN peacekeepers were exposed to. Ghana,
for example, raised concerns about the conditions imposed by Israel on
UNIFIL and emphasized that Israel should ensure the safety and security of
134
all UN personnel. Argentina emphasized the need to guarantee the safety
135
and security of UNIFIL. India, a major troop contributor to UNIFIL and
the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force, expressed concerns
about UNIFIL’s exposure to considerable risk and troops’ restricted move136
ment and stressed the sanctity of UN personnel. Tanzania noted that
UNIFIL cannot carry out its mandate in the current operative circumstanc-

130.
S.C. Res. 1697, ¶ 1 (July 31, 2006).
131.
Id. ¶¶ 2–3.
132.
See, e.g., U.N. SCOR, 61st Sess., 5493d mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5493 (July 21,
2006); U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, U.N. Doc. S/2006/560 (July 21, 2006); U.N. Secretary-General, Report
of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Resolution 1701 (2006), U.N. Doc.
S/2006/670 (Aug. 18, 2006).
133.
U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated 29 July 2006 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2006/595 (July 29, 2006).
134.
U.N. SCOR, 5493d mtg., supra note 132, at 8.
135.
Id. at 10.
136.
Id. at 34.
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137

es. The United States was present at these meetings but refrained from
138
making a statement.
Secretary-General Annan, in a letter to the President of the Security
Council following the incident in Khiam, reported that he was “disturbed to
learn that the patrol base and its surroundings have come under renewed firing by IDF in the days following the incident of 25 July, which will undoubtedly have an effect on the investigation of the site that the United Na139
tions will need to undertake shortly.” Annan emphasized that UN
peacekeepers not participating in an armed conflict are entitled to the same
140
protections as civilians under IHL. In his 2006 report to the Security
Council on UNIFIL, Annan indicated that several UNIFIL positions were
hit by IDF fire and, in more than 48 instances, UNIFIL reported IDF fire
141
close to its positions. The IDF also issued a warning that any person, in142
143
cluding UNIFIL personnel, approaching the Blue Line would be shot at.
In the final hours of the 2006 war, UNIFIL reported that its personnel endured 85 IDF-fired artillery shells and indicated that it strongly protested
144
these attacks to the IDF at the time they occurred.
There is certainly an argument to be made that the Security Council’s
inaction in Lebanon may be a byproduct of the United States’ veto power.
145
However, as demonstrated in the preceding sections, legal obligations toward peacekeeping forces are unsettled. While political considerations animate the Security Council’s decisionmaking process, the unresolved status
of peacekeepers in the international legal regime may inform the Council’s
approach here as well. In the previously quoted passage from Resolution
146
1697, the Security Council does not cite where the obligation to respect
the safety of UN personnel stems from. Israel remains outside the scope of
the Safety Convention, so perhaps the Council is alluding to IHL as the Secretary-General did.

137.
Id. at 5.
138.
Id. at 1.
139.
Letter dated 29 July 2006 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of
the Security Council, supra note 133.
140.
Id.
141.
Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon,
supra note 132, at ¶ 15.
142.
The Blue Line is the de facto border demarcation between Lebanon and Israel. It
was drawn following Israel’s withdrawal from South Lebanon in 2000. See UNIFIL Background, UNIFIL https://unifil.unmissions.org/unifil-background (last visited Mar. 28, 2019),
for more information.
143.
Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon,
supra note 132, ¶ 3.
144.
Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Resolution 1701 (2006),
supra note 132, ¶ 9.
145.
See, e.g., supra Section III(C).
146.
See supra p. 25.

Winter 2019]

The Legal Architecture of U.N. Peacekeeping

405

The Council may avoid citing a certain body of law due to the unsettled
nature of peacekeeper protections, or it may be that citing a body of law is
not a common practice of the Council. Nevertheless, it would be helpful for
the Council to state in no uncertain terms what exactly binds the parties to
ensure the safety of UNIFIL troops. “Deciding” that a certain party is in violation of that obligation would also aid in holding responsible parties accountable for violations of international law and establishing norms that respect the sanctity of UN personnel. It may not be possible in this instance
given the political context of UNIFIL, but the Security Council should be
amenable to such an approach in other peacekeeping contexts.

IV. Remnants of Solutions Past
Non-state actors, states parties to a conflict other than the host state, and
inadequate or confused legal mechanisms often precipitate miscarriages of
justice in peacekeeping missions and thwart the accomplishment of important mandates. The difficulty of bringing non-state actors into the ambit
of legal instruments is certainly a shortcoming of the international legal
framework, but it is difficult to bring states into the ambit of certain instruments as well. Furthermore, the unresolved status of UN peacekeepers in
some legal regimes compounds the problem of neighboring and/or belligerent states outside the scope of important treaties and SOFAs. Worthy attempts have been made to address some of these challenges, but the rise in
peacekeeper fatalities suggests they are not enough. This Part analyzes the
solutions offered by the report presented to the Secretary-General on improving the security of peacekeepers and their applicability to UNIFIL. It
also examines what remedies, if any, have been made available to peacekeepers injured or killed in the line of service and their families.

A. Changing the Way the UN Does Business
A 2017 report commissioned by the Secretary-General on improving
the security of UN peacekeepers describes the recent trend in peacekeeper
fatalities as “beyond a normal or acceptable level of risk, and . . . likely to
147
rise even higher.” The report attributes the increase in the deliberate targeting of UN peacekeepers to the failure of the UN and Member States to
adapt to the changing nature of peacekeeping and to take measures to oper148
ate more securely in these dangerous environments. The authors make a
number of operational recommendations, including taking timely action in
149
order to detect and mitigate threats. They also emphasize the importance
of preserving the reputation of the UN and the need to pursue those who attack UN personnel and bring them to justice; the UN must appear strong or
147.
148.
149.

CARLOS ALBERTO DOS SANTOS CRUZ, supra note 106.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 9–14.
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150

it will continue to be the target of attack. The report calls for greater use
151
of force by UN peacekeepers in the face of attack as well.
The report recommends the long-term solution of ensuring that attacks
152
on peacekeepers are brought to the attention of the ICC. The Rome Statute of the ICC in fact classifies attacks against UN peacekeepers as a war
crime in Article 8(2)(e)(iii):
For the purpose of this Statute, ‘war crimes’ means: [O]ther serious
violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts not
of an international character, within the established framework of
international law, namely, any of the following acts: Intentionally
directing attacks against personnel, installations, material, units or
vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping
mission in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as
long as they are entitled to the protection given to civilians or civil153
ian objects under the international law of armed conflict . . . .
However, not all countries—and, particularly, not all host states—are signa154
tories to the Rome Statute, including Lebanon and Israel. Accordingly,
this solution does not provide much utility in the context of UNIFIL. This
raises a question that remains unresolved: what is the appropriate venue for
prosecuting those who target UNIFIL troops if the ICC is not available and
Lebanon and Israel have maintained a state of war?
The report falls short with respect to the legal regimes applicable to UN
peacekeepers as well. Discussion of the Rome Statute is insufficient. The
significance of establishing legal norms cannot be discounted. The report
does not call for universal ratification of the Safety Convention, which is
arguably the most important regime applicable to peacekeepers, ensuring
155
their protection and accountability for harm done to them. The report also
does not account for the remaining legal regimes that apply to UN peacekeepers and that may provide alternative remedies. While leadership, operability, training, and administration are critical components of a peacekeeping force, the report should have paid greater attention to actors external to
peacekeeping forces—for example, states—and their obligations to ensure
the safety and security of UN personnel.

150.
Id. at 12.
151.
Id. at 10, 18.
152.
Id. at 22.
153.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 104.
154.
See supra Section III(C).
155.
As noted in Part III, this is not a perfect instrument, but its importance cannot be
discounted.
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B. Compensation and Deterrence
According to the UN Regulations for Field Manual Operations, a Mem156
ber State guilty of targeting peacekeepers will not be held liable. Indeed,
the Regulations indicate that the UN itself is liable for injuries to its agents
157
participating in peacekeeping missions. The UN has not accepted such liability in the past, instead paying compensation to the injured agents or their
families and simultaneously bringing a claim against the responsible Mem158
ber State as the Reparations case justifies. As discussed, however, the UN
“has had almost no success in collecting damages for its injured agents from
159
responsible States.” As such, pragmatism with respect to the viability of
peacekeeping operations and a sense of justice have compelled the UN
160
alone to pay compensation.
The UN pays the families of soldiers killed while serving as UN peace161
keepers $70,000. This compensation comes from the UN peacekeeping
162
budget. While compensating the families of victims is important, this approach does not realize the goal of criminal liability. Moreover, compensation by the UN does not achieve deterrence because the responsible party is
163
not made to pay. The prospect of criminal liability as deterrence, however,
is particularly implausible in the context of UNIFIL. It is unlikely that the
UN will raise a claim against Israel on behalf of troops killed in its service.
Furthermore, the families of UN peacekeepers have unsuccessfully attempt164
ed to hold Israel accountable for the deaths of their loved ones. At present,
it does not appear feasible to accomplish compensation by means other than
the current remedy in the context of UNIFIL, but the UN may take steps to
alter this landscape over time.
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Arsanjani, supra note 73, at 148.
157.
Id.
158.
Id.
159.
Id. at 148–49.
160.
Id. at 149.
161.
G.A. Res. 64/820 (June 18, 2010).
162.
Id.
163.
Whether this sum is substantial enough to deter a sovereign government is also
questionable. In the case of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (“MONUSCO”), the Security Council directed states to
freeze the financial assets of individuals or entities who “plan, direct, sponsor or participate in
attacks against MONUSCO peacekeepers.” S.C. Res. 2136, ¶ 4(i) (Jan. 30, 2014). The Council is unlikely to take similar action against a Member State, but doing so would be a step toward the deterrence and accountability this Note advocates for.
164.
No Apology 31 Years After Death of Sligo Soldier in Lebanon, SLIGO CHAMPION
(Jan. 6, 2018 12:00 AM), https://www.independent.ie/regionals/sligochampion/news/noapology-31-years-after-death-of-sligo-soldier-in-lebanon-36452266.html; Fisk, supra note 40.
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C. Moving Forward
Moving forward, a few avenues for arriving at greater compliance and
deterrence are available to the UN. One viable way to pursue compliance
and deterrence is for the Security Council to include language from the
Safety Convention in resolutions establishing peacekeeping forces and
providing for third-party facilitation of dispute resolution (where the Safety
Convention falls short). This language should be included as a decision in
order to vest it with the force of law. For extant peacekeeping missions, the
Security Council should endeavor to impose similar obligations on the international community as a whole. The Security Council has not shied away
from legislating in this manner in the past. For example, Resolution 1373,
issued in the aftermath of 9/11, and Resolution 1540, concerning disarmament, establish “new rules of international law rather than issuing commands to deal with a discrete conflict[.] [T]hey create obligations of a sort
165
usually found only in treaties.” The Security Council should consider doing the same to enhance peacekeeper protections.
The General Assembly should also be encouraged to include language
from the Safety Convention in its resolutions for the purpose of creating soft
law. Key provisions from the Safety Convention should be included in SOFAs, host country agreements, and the Secretary-General’s regulations for
peacekeeping missions as well. While this approach may take longer to
achieve a deterrent effect, its potential for establishing firm legal norms—
and perhaps even becoming custom—is hopeful. Moreover, it may pave the
way for the Security Council and the international community to hold states
responsible for violations of these provisions.

V. Conclusion
The UN peacekeeping regime does not exist in a vacuum, insulated
from legal frameworks and political considerations. Consequently, peacekeeping forces established by the UN are confronted by a myriad of challenges. The case of UNIFIL illustrates the many complications that may
characterize a peacekeeping operation and frustrate its mandate. This Note
establishes that the UN must exert more effort to ensure that its peacekeepers are protected in the dangerous corners of the globe to which they are deployed. Although this Note does not endeavor to describe what an adequate
legal architecture should look like, its illustration of the current architecture’s shortcomings provides guidance for moving forward.
The UN may engage a number of means to enhance peacekeeper protections. Bolstering the Safety Convention and pursuing its widespread ratification is one step. Concluding SOFAs with all parties to a conflict, not just
the host state, is another. The regulations promulgated by the Secretary-
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General for each peacekeeping mission should also incorporate the principles of the Safety Convention and include obligations for all parties to the
conflict. Such regulations are likely to be considered mere soft law, but, in
an ideal situation, they may eventually become customary international law.
The principles enshrined in the Safety Convention should be codified in
the Security Council resolutions establishing peacekeeping forces so as to
ensure the protection of these forces in the event that parties to a conflict are
not parties to the Convention. The Security Council should also consider
undertaking broader legislation efforts in this realm in order to enhance the
international community’s obligations toward peacekeepers. Security Council resolutions “deploring” and “condemning” attacks on peacekeepers must
wield more legal substance and weight. The Security Council’s role in
maintaining international peace and security—and the peacekeeping missions that are corollaries of this responsibility—inevitably implicates politics and the controversy surrounding the Permanent Five’s power. The configuration of the Security Council is unlikely to be reformed in the near
future, but the UN may pursue other avenues to encourage the Council to
ensure the safety and security of peacekeepers. Ultimately, the UN must do
more to enforce its rights and to provide its personnel with the tools necessary to secure their own rights.

